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Introduction 
Deployment of new technologies is vital to climate change policy, but it invariably poses difficult tradeoffs. Carbon capture 
and storage (CCS), which involves the capture and permanent burial of CO2 emissions, exemplifies this problem. Public 
acceptance of CCS faces an uphill battle. CCS lacks the green appeal of renewable sources of power, and disbelief is an all 
too common response of laypeople when they are told that billions of tons of CO2 can be stored underground for centuries. 
Further, despite its twin virtues of (relatively) low projected costs and enormous capacity to mitigate CO2 emissions, 
knowledgeable stakeholders often dismiss CCS as either unworkable or as an enabling technology for energy sources and 
industries that should be abandoned or retooled.1 
  
CCS is nevertheless promoted by a broad range of prominent stakeholders who assert that avoiding climate change will be 
impossible without it.2 Steven Chu, the U.S. Secretary of Energy, has argued that public support of CCS is critical and that 
the United States should “act with fierce urgency” to develop and deploy it.3 Several prominent environmental organizations, 
including the *2 Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environmental Defense Fund, and the Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change, have each endorsed CCS notwithstanding their aversion to coal-based power, which would be a primary 
beneficiary of this technology.4 Similarly, the European Commission, which has been a leader in global efforts to combat 
climate change, maintains that “we cannot reduce EU or world CO2 emissions by 50% in 2050 if we do not also use [CCS]” 
and has enacted a detailed directive to promote it.5 
  
The importance that stakeholders and governments attach to CCS is strongly associated with its scale, which could rival that 
of the largest industries on the planet. A single, mid-size coal-fired power plant emits about 3 million metric tons of CO2 per 
year.6 The corresponding daily volume of compressed CO2 would fill a supertanker every 15 days,7 and scientists estimate 
that the subsurface CO2 plume would encompass an area of 240 square kilometers after 40 years of operation.8 These 
numbers illustrate the acute need for large-scale technologies to mitigate CO2 emissions. However, the advantage of the 
enormous scale of CCS is also a source of stakeholder concern because it suggests that the risks are large as well.9 Thus, the 
large scale of CCS is simultaneously a necessity and an obstacle to its deployment. 
  
*3 A combination of factors--including uncertainties about the cost of CCS, low public awareness and understanding of the 
technology and risks, and the many years it will take to commercialize--have contributed to the relative obscurity of CCS.10 In 
contrast to this lack of public engagement, an intense battle over CCS has erupted among policy analysts, technical experts, 
and lawyers.11 Beyond concerns about the high costs of capturing CO2, two issues have dominated the debate: (1) the risks 
posed by leakage of CO2 from sequestration sites, and (2) management of the long-term liabilities (possibly extending 
hundreds of years) associated with the sites.12 
  
Skeptical academics have also complained that no risk management framework has been devised that ensures funding will be 
available to take remedial action or to compensate victims for the effects of harmful releases from sequestration sites while 
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also avoiding the problem of moral hazard.13 This conflict is alleged to arise because responsibility for sequestration sites will 
likely be ultimately transferred to a government entity for long-term stewardship.14 The incipient CCS industry has reinforced 
these fears by decrying the crippling effect that open-ended liability would have on CCS deployment,15 a position some 
prominent academics and advocates have accepted and often amplified.16 
  
*4 We argue that these fears are being fueled by misapprehensions about the risks posed by sequestration sites. A central 
challenge for CCS policy development is the potential for decision-makers to draw false analogies from prior experience. 
Controversial federal legislation, notably remediation of contaminated properties under Superfund and regulation of nuclear 
power under the Atomic Energy Act, have often framed the debate.17 However, while similarities exist, sequestration of CO2 
does not present either the causal intricacies or the severity of harms that have defined these programs.18 
  
The primary risks from sequestration sites are negative impacts on drinking-water aquifers from either leakage of CO2 or 
intrusion of native salt-laden waters (brines), which could be driven upward from sequestration reservoirs by the elevated 
pressures that result from CO2 injection.19 While contamination of drinking-water aquifers could trigger significant 
remediation costs, it is highly unlikely that these costs would be crippling,20 and the threats bear little resemblance to the 
large, chemically complex releases that made Superfund infamous.21 
  
These misunderstandings have been exacerbated by the focus of stakeholders--and until recently also of scientists--on CO2 
leakage *5 alone.22 This oversight is in large part a product of evolving scientific understanding; only recently have new 
studies revealed that the most significant risks are likely to derive from releases of reservoir brines.23 The most significant 
difference between releases of CO2 and brine is the geographic scope. While scientists estimate that CO2 plumes in 
sequestration reservoirs will extend several kilometers from a CO2 injection well, they estimate that the area of elevated 
pressure in which brines could be forced into overlying aquifers will extend across tens of kilometers.24 
  
The larger areas involved and the indirect nature of the impacts will create unique challenges for effective regulation and 
novel factual settings for liability. However, the large scale of CO2 sequestration is not entirely a negative, as large operations 
also offer economies of scale for regulation. And while impacts from releases could occur over vast areas, these impacts are 
well understood and relatively straightforward to mitigate, if not to prevent.25 Put differently, the risks are remarkably small 
relative to the volume of CO2 involved and the subsurface area covered by a typical sequestration site. 
  
Arguably, our most surprising conclusion is the modest role that common law liability is likely to play in promoting safe 
sequestration of CO2. The limiting factors are the types of harms, outlined above, and their timing. While the conventional 
belief among CCS advocates is that risks will decline rapidly in the decades after CO2 injection ends,26 new scientific studies 
are challenging this simple picture. These *6 studies have demonstrated that geologic features such as faults and reservoir 
permeability, and human infrastructure such as abandoned wells, will create a mix of near-and long-term risks, some of 
which could persist for many decades.27 
  
The combination of risks with different temporal profiles will limit the role that liability can play. Economists have long 
recognized that market mechanisms are poorly suited to mitigating risks with long latency periods.28 Reasons for this 
shortcoming include economic discounting, the short-term focus of business planning, and the limited tenure of business 
executives.29 The timing of risks is therefore an important constraint, as liability regimes are better at managing near-term 
risks. More to the point, if long-term liability offers only nominal deterrence, then the specter of moral hazard and CCS 
industry fears about open-ended liability that have received so much attention are groundless. 
  
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of CCS, focusing on geologic sequestration, and analyzes the 
scientific work on the potential for releases of CO2 and brine from sequestration reservoirs. Part II evaluates the comparative 
advantages of government regulation and common law liability; this background leads into a critical analysis of current 
concerns about long-term liability and moral hazard. Part III examines the relative efficiencies of different doctrines of 
common law liability when applied to likely releases from sequestration sites. We find support for negligence and strict 
liability, but the deterrence value of both doctrines will be limited to a subset of important near-term risks. Collectively these 
sections demonstrate that the current debate misdiagnoses the primary risks and overlooks operational factors that simplify 
application of common law liability. In part IV we propose a hybrid legal framework that combines a traditional regulatory 
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regime *7 with a novel two-tiered system of liability that is calibrated to objective site characteristics. This framework 
balances principles of economic efficiency and the realities of political viability. 
  
I. Timing and Magnitude of the Risks Posed by Carbon Sequestration 
The basic elements of CCS are straightforward enough to describe at a general level. CO2 is captured from the flue gas of an 
industrial source (such as a power plant, oil refinery, or cement kiln), compressed into a supercritical fluid30 for transportation 
to a sequestration site, and then injected into a deep brine reservoir, typically 3,000 to 10,000 feet underground, for 
permanent disposal.31 Although the capture and compression of CO2 are responsible for the bulk of the costs and many of the 
most challenging technological hurdles for CCS,32 geologic sequestration of CO2 has raised the most contentious legal and 
policy issues. 
  
This one-sided focus on geologic sequestration likely stems from the similarities of CO2 capture systems to other large-scale 
chemical processing facilities, with which people are familiar, whereas few people have experience with underground 
disposal of chemicals. The public’s unfamiliarity owes much to the inherent obscurity of subsurface waste disposal, which is 
carried out in some industries (mostly by the oil and chemical sectors) at levels that are comparable to or exceed those 
anticipated for CCS.33 This focus has also been *8 inflamed by dramatic, though not representative, incidents involving rapid 
releases of CO2, most notably the death of more than 1700 people when a huge bubble of CO2 from an underlying volcanic 
source was released from Lake Nyos in Cameroon.34 
  
The massive volumes of CO2 produced globally are, by most accounts, more than matched by the available subsurface 
storage space in geologic reservoirs.35 Various benchmarks are used to illustrate the magnitude of national and global carbon 
emissions. In the United States, for example, using CCS to eliminate 50% of CO2 emissions from the current fleet of coal-
fired power plants would involve transporting and sequestering a volume of CO2 roughly equal to the volume of oil 
consumed annually.36 Similarly, at the global level, sequestering just 15% of aggregate CO2 emissions would require 
infrastructure that could handle volumes of CO2 that exceed those of world oil production.37 
  
Recent estimates indicate that depleted oil and gas reservoirs could store 900 to 1200 gigatons of CO2 (one gigaton (Gt) is 
one billion metric tons), while the capacity of deep saline reservoirs is conservatively projected to exceed 1000 Gt of CO2 and 
is probably much greater.38 Given that annual global emissions of CO2 are currently about 30 Gt,39 the estimated capacity of 
deep brine reservoirs is sufficient to sequester the equivalent of 30 to 40 years of total global CO2 emissions or approximately 
75 to 125 years of the *9 emissions from the power sector.40 Despite the large reservoir capacities available, constraints on 
carbon-capture technologies, limited funding, and high construction costs will limit the use of CCS to a fraction of its storage 
potential, making it viable as a bridge technology for substantially longer than these estimates suggest.41 
  
Geologic sequestration occurs in tiny cavities, or “pore spaces,” that are intrinsic to most sedimentary rocks.42 At a crude 
level of description, the Earth’s crust consists of two basic types of rock--igneous and sedimentary. As the latter name 
suggests, sedimentary rocks are formed from thick accumulations of sand, clay, salts, and silt over millions of years. The 
resulting rock is interspersed with porous and permeable layers (sand) as well as impermeable layers (clay, silt, salt).43 Basins 
of sedimentary rock typically contain thousands of cubic meters of porous sediments that are filled with water that is saltier 
than seawater (hence these basins are called “brine reservoirs”).44 The layers of clay, silt, and salt provide impermeable “cap 
rock” that is a natural barrier to movement of CO2, which would otherwise be carried upward as it is more buoyant than 
water.45 Injected CO2, which displaces the brine in a sedimentary formation,46 will be permanently immobilized by chemical 
processes (for example, by dissolution into the brine) that operate on timescales ranging from tens to hundreds of years.47 
  
Despite encouraging statistics and science, the proposal to bury billion of tons of CO2 underground for centuries is 
understandably viewed as a dubious form of geoengineering by some. In fact, this kind of response ought to be expected 
because few people have experience with large-scale industries, and fewer still are comfortable with the geological scales of 
carbon sequestration. And yet substantial *10 precedent exists for carbon sequestration in natural and industrial settings. 
  
The trapping capacity of sedimentary basins has been exhaustively studied, in part because oil, gas, and CO2 have been 
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naturally trapped in sedimentary formations for millions of years.48 As alluded to above, industries have been storing and 
disposing of liquids and gases underground without causing significant releases for decades.49 Supercritical CO2 has itself 
been used for nearly four decades to facilitate oil production. This process also involves pumping large volumes of CO2 
underground, and its safety record is excellent.50 Moreover, the technologies needed for drilling into deep brine reservoirs, 
injecting CO2,51 and monitoring sequestration sites are well developed, although more elaborate site characterization and 
monitoring will be required to deploy CCS at full scale.52 Thus, despite its apparent novelty, sequestration of CO2 in geologic 
formations is not a wildly speculative gambit, but is instead based on extensive (though clearly still evolving) scientific work 
and years of engineering experience with technically similar projects. 
  
A. Types of Risks 
Like any complex engineering problem, especially one reliant on the difficult-to-access details of subsurface geology, CO2 
sequestration projects will not be risk-free. The potential risks are, however, relatively well understood and expected to be 
manageable, particularly in comparison to the technical uncertainties typical of terrestrial sequestration of CO2.53 Most 
scientists believe that releases of CO2 or brines into groundwater will be the two major sources of environmental risk,54 
although some scientists have also suggested *11 that seismic activity could be induced by CO2 injection.55 Even they 
acknowledge, though, that seismicity is unlikely and is preventable with proper siting, installation, and monitoring.56 
  
We will focus on the risks posed by releases of CO2 and brine. The most significant form of environmental harm from such 
releases is predicted to be contamination of drinking water by, for example, mobilization of toxic metals or increased 
salinity.57 While other harms are possible, such as asphyxiation from CO2 accumulating in the basements of buildings or CO2 
in soils killing plants,58 they are believed to be of secondary importance due to their very remote likelihood.59 Taking into 
account singular events like the release of CO2 from Lake Nyos, little or no evidence exists that direct atmospheric releases of 
CO2 could be a significant threat to humans.60 
  
*12 Abandoned wells and faults in cap rock are believed to be the primary pathways for releases of CO2 or brine.61 The risk 
of leakage through abandoned wells arises because wellbores can corrode and cements can chemically degrade over time.62 
At the extremes, releases could be near term and involve large volumes of CO2, such as a release from a poorly capped well 
in the immediate vicinity of a CO2 injection well, or they could involve very slow leaks, for example, through small, 
undetected subsurface faults in sedimentary cap rock.63 Experts believe that careful site selection and characterization, along 
with early-detection systems for leakage, can reduce the impacts of such releases.64 
  
*13 B. CO2 Plumes and Brine Displacement in Sequestration Reservoirs 
The two primary sources of risk to groundwater--direct release of CO2 and pressure-driven intrusion of brines--have 
significantly different risk profiles.65 While the elevated pressures associated with injection of CO2 cause movement of both 
CO2 and brine, the pressure field will have effects far beyond the maximum extent of the CO2 plume.66 These pressure effects 
will cause subsurface fluid flow, which, depending on the permeability and morphology of the sedimentary basin, could 
cause reservoir brines to be forced through an upward sloping sedimentary rock layer that leads to nearby or (more likely) 
distant wells used for drinking water.67 Releases could also occur when either a CO2 plume or brine within a zone of elevated 
pressure encounters a fault in the cap rock or an abandoned well that is incompletely capped.68 
  
The risks associated with leakage of CO2 and movement of brine into aquifers will not be identical in magnitude or timing. 
Leakage of CO2 will not be dependent on the elevated pressures around an injection well, as the buoyancy of CO2 is 
sufficiently high to drive it to *14 the surface and to propel it laterally.69 By contrast, because brine intrusion is driven by 
elevated pressure, the potential area of risk in the reservoir will continue to expand for many decades after CO2 injection 
ceases as the pressure in the reservoir equilibrates.70 The specific timing will be highly dependent on the rate of fluid flow. 
Reservoirs with low resistance will re-equilibrate relatively rapidly, whereas those with high resistance will sustain higher 
pressures around injection wells, and it will take much longer for the pressure fields to expand and dissipate.71 
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The potential for CO2 or pressurized brine to encounter a transmissive fault or wellbore increases with subsurface area; as a 
consequence, the aggregate risk of releases will rise with the areal extent of both the CO2 plume and the zone of elevated 
pressure.72 The risk of CO2 leakage will decline as chemical processes immobilize it, whereas the likelihood of brine intrusion 
will be solely a function of the pressure in the reservoir. Understanding the dynamics of CO2 plumes and the spread of 
pressure from an injection well is therefore essential to understanding the primary risks associated with sequestration sites. 
  
The recognition that the pressure effects of CO2 injection will travel much more rapidly and for far greater distances than the 
CO2 plume itself is arguably the single most important result of recent scientific work on geologic sequestration.73 In a 2008 
simulation study *15 that incorporated detailed empirical data on subsurface conditions in Texas, the researchers found that 
50 years after the end of active CO2 injection, the CO2 plume would extend just 3 to 5 kilometers from the injection well, 
whereas the field of elevated pressure was projected to extend many tens of kilometers from the well.74 Several other 
independent models have generated similar results, with the CO2 plumes spanning several kilometers and the much larger 
pressure fields extending tens of kilometers from injection wells.75 
  
A recent modeling study of particular note ran a series of simulations involving multiple injection wells in a reservoir located 
in Illinois.76 The simulations predicted that CO2 migration would be slow, on average 3.3 meters per year post-injection, such 
that in one representative simulation, the plume did not reach the cap rock after 200 years.77 In the same study, the maximum 
lateral length of the CO2 plumes was estimated to be 5.5 km (about 3 miles) after 50 years and just 13.5 km (8 miles) after 
200 years, with no direct plume interference between storage sites during this period.78 The simulations also found that after 
200 years “the vast majority of the injected CO2 [was] contained via residual and solubility trapping, leaving only 13% as 
mobile phase.”79 This result suggests that the risk of CO2 leakage can drop dramatically within the first hundred or so years 
after a site transitions to permanent closure and long-term management (often referred to as “long-term stewardship”). 
  
The Illinois basin study adds further support for the importance of brine intrusion, despite predicting that reservoir pressure 
would drop rapidly and then plateau at about 100 years after the end of CO2 *16 injection.80 The model simulations projected 
that the areas of elevated pressure sufficient to cause brine intrusion would extend 150 km from the injection wells.81 The 
areas of elevated pressure also spread quickly; interactions between wells were found within half a year, and reservoir 
pressure effects (which extended beyond the 275 km radius) were indivisible between the twenty wells by the end of 50 years 
of active CO2 injection.82 
  
This study also simulated the effects of faults in cap rock, of leaky abandoned wells, and of flow outside of the model 
boundary. The model predicted very little brine movement of any kind (that is, flow through cap rock breaches or the lateral 
boundaries of the model) over the first 50 years of operation.83 Moreover, although the movement of brine rose rapidly in the 
simulations over the 50 year injection period (reaching a maximum rate after 63 years), movement of brine was not the 
primary mechanism for accommodating the injected CO2 until more than 150 years after injection was initiated.84 It was not 
until 200 years had passed that leakage through faults and abandoned wells in the core injection area accounted for 
approximately one-third of the brine displaced by the injected CO2, but even with the substantial volumes of brine mobilized, 
the great depth of the reservoir mitigated any impacts on overlying aquifers.85 Similar results were obtained by other 
researchers using a different model and alternative assumptions; they estimated delays for detectable impacts on overlying 
aquifers of 50 to 150 years after CO2 injection had ceased.86 
  
The results of these recent studies have important implications for regulatory policies and potential liabilities associated with 
sequestration sites. At the broadest level, the potential for brine intrusion into valuable sources of drinking water may be the 
factor that determines the capacity and hence the viability of sequestration sites.87 The enormous subsurface areas of elevated 
pressure around *17 sequestration sites will exacerbate the regulatory burdens and the technical challenges of site 
characterization because areas of regulatory significance could exceed 100,000 square km for a single site.88 Similarly, 
because zones of elevated pressure will extend far beyond a given injection well, and interactions between them will arise 
rapidly, permitting of sequestration sites should be coordinated across different wells.89 
  
If the recent scientific work is borne out, liability for releases of brine from a sequestration reservoir with multiple injection 
sites will be indivisible within a few years after the start of CO2 injection.90 Further, because brine intrusion is driven by 
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and salt molecules are perfectly fungible) will occur across the reservoir. This is as pure an example of indivisible causation 
for a tort as one could expect to find.91 By contrast, the CO2 plumes are projected to remain localized for many decades, 
thereby minimizing the potential for physical overlap and avoiding divisibility problems with assigning liability. These 
results expose the heightened risks presented by releases of brine from sequestration reservoirs. They are both more probable 
and likely to be of longer duration than releases of CO2, and the degree to which concerns about direct leakage of CO2 have 
been overemphasized and ought to be reassessed. 
  
The emerging scientific work on sequestration of CO2 and decades of experience in the oil and gas industries demonstrate 
that uncertainties about risks will remain even under the best circumstances.92 This should not be read to preclude bounded 
estimates of risks, as several recent efforts to formulate risk assessment frameworks indicate that such estimates are feasible.93 
*18 These works suggest that established methods of subsurface characterization and modeling should be able to provide 
reasonable estimates of potential risks. Relatively simple metrics, such as the number of wells in the area, the density of 
faults, and the permeability of a reservoir, can be used in intuitively tractable and transparent models to establish conservative 
upper bounds for the most important sources of risk from sequestration sites.94 
  
C. Sequestration of CO2 and Carbon Accounting 
The monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of CO2 emissions offsets is among the most politically contentious and 
technically challenging issues impeding global efforts to address climate change.95 The limited experience that exists for 
offsetting CO2 emissions suggests that MRV for other forms of climate change mitigation (such as reforestation projects) is 
likely to be even more technically complex and politically divisive than for CCS. 
  
Against this backdrop, CCS has a number of relative virtues, even if the potential challenges of accurately determining 
leakage rates from sequestration reservoirs are taken into account. At the outset, the large scale of CCS systems makes them a 
relatively easy target for regulation, and unlike many forms of terrestrial sequestration,96 the amount of CO2 that is captured 
and sequestered underground is susceptible to direct measurement that is both precise and accurate.97 Scientists are also 
confident that leakage of CO2 from *19 well-managed sequestration sites is “likely to be small in magnitude and distant in 
time.”98 
  
Significant technical challenges and uncertainties nevertheless remain regarding capacities to monitor fugitive emissions and 
reservoir leakage. Technical experts believe that fugitive emissions from large-scale industrial systems used to capture, 
transport, and inject CO2 can be estimated with a reasonable degree of accuracy and consistent with existing reporting 
methods.99 Qualitative methods exist for estimating leakage rates from reservoirs, and some commentators have suggested 
that they could be supplemented by measuring surface fluxes of CO2.100 (We are skeptical, given the natural variability in 
background levels of CO2.) Large leaks will be readily detectible, and in most cases (such as leakage through abandoned 
wells), they will be rapidly closed.101 A major impediment is simply that data on reservoir leakage are extremely limited, as it 
has only just recently become the subject of intensive scientific study.102 
  
In sum, CCS appears to have several advantages over other methods of offsetting CO2 emissions, and although it has 
significant technical limitations, the limitations of the potential alternatives are likely to be much more severe.103 Moreover, 
while it is possible that the large scale of CCS could backfire, for example, if a large leak in a reservoir were to arise and 
could not be plugged, the probability of such an occurrence is believed to be exceedingly slight.104 The relative ease of CO2 
accounting provides an independent motivation for deploying CCS and has important implications for the efficient operation 
of common law liability. 
  
*20 II. The Importance of Ex Ante Regulation and the Absence of Moral Hazard 
Sequestering CO2 underground for approximately 1,000 years will push the bounds of governments’ institutional capacities 
and legal frameworks.105 Environmental risks that span long timeframes pose particularly challenging problems for both ex 
ante regulations and ex post liability regimes.106 At the most basic level, very few human institutions have lifespans in the 
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hundreds of years. Leaders of public and private institutions themselves have short time horizons, often estimated to be on 
the order of 10 to 15 years,107 and this bias is reinforced by the difficulties of holding decision-makers accountable for impacts 
of decisions that arise decades into the future.108 
  
The debate over regulation of carbon sequestration recognized these temporal challenges early on. As a consequence, 
proposed policies have included complete transfer of liability to the government after an active post-closure period for a site, 
partial transfer of long-term liability to the government with companies retaining liability up to a legally prescribed limit, as 
well as conventional open-ended corporate liability.109 Yet, while there is broad consensus that responsibility for carbon 
sequestration sites should ultimately be transferred to the federal government, many questions have been raised about how 
and when this should occur.110 
  
There appears to be general agreement that traditional state common law doctrines alone cannot effectively address the risks 
posed by carbon sequestration.111 Commentators have singled out problems with identifying the specific source of CO2 (which 
may occur if multiple companies sequester CO2 in the same or spatially *21 overlapping deep brine reservoirs) and the 
extremely long timescale over which leakage of CO2 can occur.112 Proposed legal responses have included enhanced forms of 
tort liability (such as strict liability or joint and several liability), insurance requirements, establishment of a federal funding 
pool, and bonding requirements.113 
  
Virtually all of the proposed policies are multilayered and tailored to specific stages in the lifecycle of a carbon sequestration 
site: active operation and injection, site closure, a 10 to 30 year period of post-closure monitoring and oversight, and finally 
long-term stewardship.114 The work of Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson is exemplary in this respect. They have 
advocated the following liability framework:115 First, during active operation and CO2 injection, the owner is liable for harm 
caused by site operations (the liability could derive from tort or statutory law), is required to hold adequate insurance, and is 
obliged to pay into a central fund for long-term stewardship of the site.116 Second, throughout the closure and post-closure 
period, the owner is responsible for site monitoring, verification, and any necessary remediation, is held liable for damages 
caused by CO2 releases, and is required to have financial backup in the form of bonds or insurance.117 Third, when a site 
enters long-term stewardship, all liabilities and responsibility for site oversight shift to the federal government.118 
  
Resolving the appropriate set of policy instruments for the final stage (long-term stewardship) has proven to be particularly 
contentious. CCS industry leaders have singled out long-term liability as a major impediment to growth in the carbon 
sequestration industry.119 They claim that the uncertainty associated with long-term *22 site liability creates an investment 
risk that makes CCS a non-starter.120 On the other side, critics of carbon sequestration and those concerned about the moral 
hazard created by relieving industry of liability have strongly opposed frameworks that transfer long-term site liability to the 
government.121 Everyone, irrespective of their view about CCS, agrees that long-term site liability must be addressed one way 
or another. 
  
We argue that little or no tension exists between long-term liability, which is presumed to provide incentives for industry to 
safely select and operate sequestration sites, and the environmentally sound development of geologic carbon sequestration. 
The reason, however, lies outside the existing debate because ex post tort liability is an ineffective deterrent for decisions that 
have impacts with long periods of latency. The conflict consequently disappears because little is lost when a company is 
relieved of long-term liability. Drawing on the technical details described above, it becomes clear that ex ante regulation is 
the single most important policy instrument for ensuring that latent impacts are factored into siting and operations decisions 
essential to the long-term safety of carbon sequestration sites. 
  
The discussion that follows will focus on traditional principles of economic efficiency. We have framed the issues in this 
manner for two reasons. First, the objections being raised about moral hazard are based on conventional economic principles. 
Second, we take it as a given that environmentalists, particularly those who endorse the precautionary principle, will be 
sympathetic to subjecting sequestration sites to strict regulation and enhanced liability. The novelty of the technology, the 
potential for irreversible harm, and the anticipated scale of operations all reinforce this view.122 Those with a conservative 
economic perspective, by contrast, will be skeptical of such interventions. By drawing on economic arguments and 
particularly on a deterrence-based view of tort law,123 we are able to *23 ground our case for a mixed system of regulation and 
liability on principles that can overcome these objections. 
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A. Regulation Versus Common Law Liability 
Whether common law tort liability and ex ante environmental regulation are substitutes for each other or complementary 
regimes has been hotly contested for decades. For a long time, orthodox economic theory considered them to be substitutes, 
as both are designed to correct inefficiencies that derive from environmental externalities.124 Economists have since come to 
appreciate that structural features of ex post tort liability and ex ante regulation create important differences in how each 
system operates in practice, and that these differences produce opportunities for them to complement each other.125 Although 
still evolving, subsequent economic analyses have attempted to provide guidance on how tort liability and regulation can be 
effectively used in tandem.126 
  
Parallel use of tort liability and regulation, to varying degrees, has long been accepted by lawyers and policymakers. For 
public policies ranging from consumer products to industrial emissions, dual use of tort liability and regulation is more often 
the rule than the exception.127 Thus, while disagreement exists over many specifics, most legal academics recognize that 
regulatory agencies and common law courts play a complementary role in protecting public safety and the environment.128 
  
*24 Commentators have also recognized that harm-inducing activities exist on a continuum that ranges from discrete actions 
involving individualized harm (for example, the risk from chopping down a tree in one’s yard) to mass torts involving 
thousands of claimants (for example, harms from air pollution or mass torts such as asbestos).129 It is now broadly accepted 
that the effectiveness of ex post tort liability relative to ex ante regulation varies dramatically across this spectrum of 
activities.130 
  
Propelled in part by the rise of mass torts in the 1980s, economists and lawyers began to arrive at a loose consensus on a set 
of structural features that distinguish the relative merits of tort liability and regulatory regimes. Steven Shavell, a leading 
economist writing in the area, was among the first to identify a set of governing criteria. He identified four primary factors: 
(1) knowledge asymmetries between the private sector and expert regulatory agencies, (2) capital constraints of liable 
corporate defendants, (3) likelihood that suits will be brought against liable defendants, and (4) administrative costs of 
implementing regulatory programs versus litigating tort suits.131 Shavell went on to describe subsidiary conditions that 
influence the impact of each of these factors, and thus whether tort liability is favored over regulation, or vice versa, or 
whether some combination of the two is likely to be most efficient.132 
  
1. Shavell Framework 
  
Several broad patterns emerged from Shavell’s analysis, as well as from the work of other commentators.133 The impact of 
knowledge asymmetries, which were assumed to favor private interests due to their detailed knowledge of their facilities and 
processes, has figured prominently in this discourse.134 But economists were forced to reassess this intuitive assumption when 
they realized that it could *25 break down for health and safety regulations.135 It became evident that many businesses, 
especially smaller ones, have little knowledge about the environmental and human health effects of their operations.136 
Accordingly, even if corporate officials have superior knowledge about reducing polluting emissions, their inability to assess 
the risks to the environment or human health creates a countervailing knowledge asymmetry that favors regulation over 
common law liability.137 Knowledge asymmetries therefore often cut both ways, and their net effect can be difficult to predict. 
  
Shavell’s other factors have been less subject to revision. His insight about the impact of capital constraints is as vital as ever. 
The basic principle is simple: if a defendant’s capacity to pay is less than the damages it could inflict, its capacity to pay will 
operate as a de facto cap on potential liability, and the incentive for due care created by tort liability will be inefficiently 
weak.138 Moreover, because the amount of a company’s capital at stake will influence the cost of the insurance it purchases, 
insurance on its own will not offset these shortfalls. The effect of capital constraints can also create a perverse incentive for 
corporations to limit their exposure by spinning off the parts of their businesses vulnerable to large liabilities (such as mass 
torts) into small, low-capital companies. In general, the efficiency of ex post liability will decline the more potential liabilities 
exceed the capital reserves of a defendant.139 
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The likelihood that plaintiffs will file suit, if low, also erodes the effectiveness of tort liability, as it influences the probability 
that a defendant will be found liable. Two primary factors are important here: the degree to which harm is dispersed over a 
large number of people and the potential for substantial delay before a suit is filed.140 As a general rule, the probability of suit 
drops as the stake of any given person declines or the delay after which harm occurs grows. 
  
The reasoning is again straightforward. If no plaintiff has a significant stake, no one will be motivated to incur the costs of 
bringing suit. Further, insofar as class actions are available to overcome the low stakes of individual plaintiffs, experience 
suggests *26 that organizing a large group of plaintiffs can impede litigation, particularly if they have heterogeneous 
interests.141 Delay is problematic for plaintiffs because the evidence necessary to demonstrate who caused the harm and 
whether their actions were negligent will typically be more difficult to obtain.142 Corporate executives will also discount the 
liability posed by distant suits based on the likelihood of suit and other factors discussed further below, thereby undermining 
the incentives provided by tort liability.143 
  
Administrative costs of tort liability and regulatory regimes are driven by different factors. The administrative costs of 
regulatory regimes for CCS would be high because of the complexity of technical rulemaking and because regulatory 
oversight would apply to all sites, regardless of whether or not they are operating safely.144 Conversely, tort regimes’ costs 
scale with the number of claimants and the complexity of the harms; thus, the smaller the number of potential claimants and 
the simpler the technical issues, the more tort liability is favored.145 Roughly speaking, the balance will tip toward regulation 
with larger numbers of claimants and higher complexity because the cost savings of individualized rulings, which are 
triggered only when harm actually arises, are offset by the efficiency gained from generally applicable regulations. 
  
Commentators have also identified other factors affecting administrative costs. These include the uncertainty of legal 
standards, which typically favors regulation;146 the confounding of harms attributable to background risks from other sources, 
such as exposure to background levels of cancer-causing chemicals;147 and the challenges of clearly defining the potential 
class of victims, particularly in the case of mass tort actions where indirect impacts can become important.148 
  
The literature in this area is voluminous and still growing. Many variations on Shavell’s initial framework have emerged that 
advocate *27 different mixes of policies or identify circumstances in which specific forms of liability are favored over others 
or are superior to traditional regulation. Paul Calcott and Stephen Hutton, for example, have suggested that if regulatory 
oversight is error-free, then negligence-based liability combined with regulation is more efficient than strict liability.149 In a 
more recent analysis, Rouillon asserts that the use of regulation and tort liability “is always optimal” and that regulatory 
standards “should be designed in a less stringent manner when used jointly” with tort liability.150 
  
Much of this work is based on econometric studies subject to limiting assumptions that qualify the inferences one can draw 
from them. Accordingly, beyond the broad framework developed by Shavell, large uncertainties remain about how liability 
and regulatory regimes can be optimally combined. 
  
2. Private Versus Public Discounting of Latent Environmental Harms 
  
Economists commonly describe the principal objectives of a tort system as preventing accidents, compensating victims, and 
minimizing administrative costs.151 These objectives are frustrated when there is a long delay between the distribution of a 
product, harmful exposure, or decision triggering the risk of harm and the occurrence of harm: 
When harmful exposure has occurred decades earlier, it is virtually impossible to achieve any meaningful 
preventive effect through the allocation of civil liability. There are insurmountable problems of 
discontinuity in enterprise management, unforeseeability of the parameters of risk, doubts about the 
contributory fault of others, speculativeness in discounting to present value . . . .152 
  
  
Put simply, the latency of harm can negate the incentives provided by a tort system. Incentives are further eroded when latent 
harms affect multiple victims and individual suits cannot be consolidated in a single class action suit.153 In two such cases--
harm to individuals living downwind of the Nevada nuclear weapons test site *28 and victims of Agent Orange during the 
Vietnam war--the result was “staggering litigation costs and years of delay.”154 
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The diminished incentives for corporate actors are particularly acute. As one commentator has noted, the “typical corporate 
decisionmaker . . . likely does not give much weight to the prospect of a liability judgment many decades into the future.”155 
This myopia is driven in large part by the difficulty of holding decision-makers accountable for latent risks,156 and by the 
short investment time horizon of senior managers that is reinforced by the arguably even shorter time horizon of shareholders 
in evaluating the profitability of firms.157 As a consequence, even economically efficient decisions for future cost avoidance 
will lose against options with immediate effect, as executives will have nothing to show for the former.158 Long latency 
periods can also produce perverse incentives for companies to operate with relative impunity and then go out of business, or 
alternatively to structure themselves into small, low-cap companies to limit their ultimate liability.159 
  
A perfectly functioning market would preclude such divergences between a corporate actor’s near-term interests and the 
long-term interests of the company, but this presumes that accurate information is available on latent risks, which often is not 
the case because risks may be inchoate (the problem of “unknown unknowns”) until new information or understanding 
become available or harms actually arise.160 Even without such impediments, deferral of liability is the next best thing to not 
having to pay at all; to make this concrete, $1 million of liability 40 years in the future has a net present value of just *29 
$452,890.161 Routine economic accounting of latent harm on its own causes the incentives provided by common law liability 
to be (perhaps rationally) discounted substantially. 
  
The factors outlined above, among others, have led legal commentators to conclude that products or activities that produce 
harms with long latency periods negate the preventative effect of liability regimes and shift the primary goal of legal liability 
“to devising a low cost, equitable method of compensating victims.”162 Under these circumstances, no-fault liability schemes 
(such as the Price-Anderson Act for nuclear power reactors163 and the Black Lung compensation system164) have a 
comparative advantage over traditional tort liability, but policymakers must be careful in designing them, as they too can be 
undermined by litigation.165 The failure of common law regimes to deter latent harms also places a high premium on effective 
ex ante regulation, which is left as the primary means of deterring such harms.166 
  
More fundamental analytical problems arise when harms are latent for timescales of more than a few decades. Questions of 
intergenerational equity are important for timescales of this magnitude, and conventional methods of economic discounting 
become “speculative” and hotly contested.167 Liberal economists like Nicholas Stern maintain that social discount rates for 
*30 intergenerational impacts should be close to zero, as opposed to the market rates of seven percent advocated by more 
conservative economists.168 The important point for our purposes is that were the United States to adopt the Stern approach, 
private and public discount rates for the long-term risks associated with carbon sequestration would diverge dramatically. 
This divergence would undermine a liability regime because higher private discount rates would result in a societally 
inefficient (that is, low) level of deterrence for such long-term risks. 
  
B. Implications for the Debate over Long-Term Liability 
The preceding discussion describes the limits of tort liability as a legal mechanism for mitigating risky behavior and 
compensating victims. With respect to carbon sequestration, the Achilles’ heel of tort liability is latency, which stands to be a 
significant, if not a dominant, characteristic of the risks associated with releases of CO2 or brine. However, unlike cases 
involving mass torts or many forms of environmental harms, the impediments posed by latency are less likely to derive from 
evidentiary gaps or scientific complexity. Particularly for site-selection decisions, neither information about the sequestered 
CO2 nor about causation will diminish over time. Nor, as we argue further below, should capital limits or the dispersed nature 
of the harms pose significant barriers. The limited effectiveness of liability will instead be driven by the near-term focus of 
corporate decision-making and potentially divergent private and public discount rates. 
  
A perhaps Pyrrhic benefit of corporate myopia in this context is that it averts concerns that transferring responsibility for 
long-term liabilities from carbon sequestration sites to the government will compromise incentives that companies would 
otherwise have to safely select and operate their sites. Despite the abundance of attention that this putative conflict has 
received, the institutional limits of corporate accountability and the human psychology of latent harms negate the 
effectiveness of ex post liability regimes as an efficient deterrent for long-term risks. 
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Only government regulation has the capacity to target risks with long latency periods.169 Yet, one must acknowledge that 
regulators are also subject to temporal myopia and political pressures that erode *31 their willingness or ability to promulgate 
regulations that adequately consider long-term risks.170 In contrast to most private entities, however, countervailing pressures 
from powerful organizations and individuals committed to environmental protection exist within and outside government.171 
Differences also exist between the public and private sectors in their respective institutional norms, ranging from normative 
mandates to the appropriate discount rate, discussed above. Accordingly, and notwithstanding its own limitations, the 
government is institutionally better placed than the private sector to factor long-term risks into its decision-making 
processes.172 
  
Contrary to concerns raised in debates over legal liability for releases of CO2 from sequestration sites, neither fears about 
unbounded long-term liability nor concerns about limiting it should be impediments to the safe deployment of geologic 
carbon sequestration. Instead, concerns about ensuring that carbon sequestrations sites are selected and operated with due 
care ought to be focused foremost on promulgating effective performance-based regulations. 
  
III. The Appropriate Forms and Limited Role of Tort Liability 
This section evaluates the circumstances under which traditional tort liability may provide meaningful deterrence against 
poor site selection and operation, as well as compensate victims when releases of brine or CO2 do occur.173 The analysis in the 
preceding section on the limitations of tort liability bounds the arguments made here: tort liability will play a secondary role 
to regulation. Our objective is briefly to analyze the tort doctrines available and specifically to determine whether enhanced 
forms of tort liability can offer an efficient means of mitigating near-term risks from carbon sequestration sites. Anticipating 
the arguments of opponents to enhanced liability, we begin by showing that there is little reason for *32 concern that CO2 
sequestration sites will be subject to the pathologies critics commonly associated with enhanced liability for environmental 
harms. 
  
A. Misplaced Fears About Liability for Releases from Sequestration Sites 
The legacies of Superfund, which governs liability for cleaning up contaminated property, and the more recent experience 
with a somewhat novel extension of tort liability to oil companies for the release of a gasoline additive (MTBE) from gas 
stations have overshadowed policy debates about CCS. We will distinguish the circumstances of each from the distinctive 
conditions relevant to carbon sequestration. It is relatively straightforward to show that the underlying bases for critics’ 
concerns simply do not apply to carbon sequestration. With this case made, we then turn to the substantive analysis of the 
appropriate role for tort liability. 
  
1. The Long Shadow of Superfund Liability 
  
Decades of experience have shown that timely remediation of contaminated sites and compensation for damages to plaintiffs 
from environmental releases is enormously difficult to achieve. Superfund, which retroactively established strict, joint and 
several liability for releases of hazardous compounds into the environment, is viewed by its critics as exemplary of the 
pathologies endemic to enhanced tort liability for environmental harms.174 Yet, passage of Superfund was motivated by the 
salutary belief that “imposing a broad net of liability with a minimal causation requirement, limited defenses, and joint and 
several responsibility would encourage expeditious settlement of cases” and site cleanups.175 Thirty years after it became law, 
debate continues over the costs of implementing Superfund and its record of remediating contaminated sites. 
  
Critics of Superfund believe, for a variety of reasons, that its objectives have been met only sporadically. Drawing on decades 
of data, they assert that cleanup of many sites was delayed by years and that disputes over liability and cost allocation led to 
an enormous amount of costly litigation.176 Some estimates suggest that the total *33 public and private transaction costs 
associated with Superfund liability amount to between 24 and 44% of the direct costs of cleanup.177 These commentators 
maintain that the sheer magnitude of the liability (hundreds of millions of dollars at the largest sites) and the moral 
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indignation of defendants at being held retroactively liable--jointly and severally no less--for decades-old releases caused an 
industry backlash that fueled Superfund litigation for years.178 
  
Even accepting these criticisms, which are hotly contested,179 one must be careful in drawing inferences from experience 
under Superfund. This is particularly true for releases from sequestration sites because the conditions that complicated 
implementation of Superfund are largely absent. First, the imposition of enhanced liability would be prospective, thereby 
avoiding a primary source of the perceived unfairness of Superfund. Second, dramatic differences in the relative 
contributions of different parties are less likely to arise given the infrastructure costs and benefits of scale for sequestering 
CO2, as most if not all sequestration sites will be large and thus of similar scale.180 Third, and perhaps most important, releases 
from sequestration reservoirs will involve only two substances, brine or CO2, and the amount of CO2 sequestered will be 
closely monitored and independently verified.181 Both of these factors will greatly simplify liability suits and, if joint and 
several liability were to apply, contribution actions between defendants. Fourth, because the damages caused by leakage of 
CO2 are projected to be modest and information about relative contributions difficult to contest,182 quick settlements should be 
the norm. Each of these factors militates against the pathologies that critics associate with Superfund. 
  
Critics also raise the specter that imposing enhanced liability could cause corporations to employ strategic responses to 
mitigate their liability. Such second-order strategic responses often involve *34 companies spinning-off or outsourcing high-
risk activities to smaller entities as a means of effectively capping or circumventing liability.183 The limited resources and 
diminished exposure of smaller companies can in turn cause them to underinvest in risk-management capabilities and 
technical resources, effectively nullifying the expected benefits of strict liability. More troubling, the net effect of imposing 
strict liability could be negative, with environmental releases actually increasing under a strict liability regime,184 although 
these claims are also contested.185 
  
In any case, the economics of geologic sequestration ought to preclude such corporate gerrymandering. The benefits of scale 
raise the costs of limiting liability in this manner while the modest risks lower the liabilities at stake; both disfavor this type 
of strategic behavior. Although we expect it will be unnecessary, policymakers (and ultimately judges) may nevertheless 
want to protect against such tactics. Borrowing from Superfund, this could be achieved by extending liability to upstream 
generators of CO2, which would give them an additional incentive to select reputable companies and to demand transparent 
accounting of sequestration operations. 
  
2. Misreading the Implications of the MTBE Controversy 
  
Tort liability is controversial in many settings, and liability for environmental harm beyond Superfund has also inspired 
industry cynicism and scorn. The most recent high-visibility incident involved the release of the gasoline additive methyl-
tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) from poorly maintained underground storage tanks into drinking water aquifers.186 MTBE has 
been frequently singled out as a cautionary story that illustrates the dangers of tort liability for geologic sequestration of 
CO2.187 MTBE was certified by the EPA in the early 1990s to mitigate vehicle emissions and subsequently used *35 widely 
throughout the United States.188 Unfortunately, by the late 1990s MTBE was discovered in many public water supplies and 
identified as a suspected human carcinogen.189 Much class-action litigation ensued.190 
  
The lawsuits were not, however, brought against the gas stations from which MTBE had leaked. Instead, the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys targeted large oil companies, which were far fewer in number and had the capital to cover the remediation costs and 
damages.191 The plaintiffs claimed that the oil companies had negligently distributed gasoline containing MTBE with prior 
knowledge of its environmental risks.192 To the surprise of many critics, the plaintiffs’ strategy was successful despite 
evidentiary challenges in establishing liability (MTBE spread widely and rapidly underground). Those challenges were 
overcome by imposing proportional liability based on each company’s market share.193 Needless to say, this did not sit well 
with the industry, which viewed the targeting of oil companies as unfair because they were not directly responsible for the 
releases of MTBE and, perhaps more infuriatingly, because the EPA had sanctioned the use of MTBE in gasoline.194 
  
Many legal commentators view the MTBE saga in a very different and much rosier light. They maintain that the plaintiffs’ 
success demonstrates the flexibility of tort law and its capacity to correct regulatory failures.195 According to this perspective, 
courts were justified in extending liability to the oil companies for two reasons. First, the oil companies had both sufficient 
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financial resources and the capacity to broadly spread the costs of the liability, whereas the victims had neither.196 Second, 
extending liability to the *36 oil companies created an incentive for them to ensure that the small entities selling their 
products are safely operated and adequately insured. 
  
Whatever one’s view of the MTBE litigation, leakage of brine or CO2 from geologic sequestration sites is unlikely to trigger a 
similar controversy. Perhaps most importantly, it is doubtful that carbon sequestration sites will be either owned by small 
entities or cause economically ruinous damage. As we have shown, the technical complexities, regulatory demands, 
infrastructure costs, and scale of individual sites all cut against an industry structure mirroring that of the oil industry (that is, 
large corporate producers and refiners upstream and small, low-capital businesses at the retail level).197 The potential harms 
will also be less widespread and costly. 
  
Finally, given the technical limits of site characterization methods and the recognition among experts that some degree of 
leakage is unavoidable,198 regulatory gaps will be inescapable and should be anticipated upfront. Subjecting companies, up- or 
downstream, to tort liability under these circumstances hardly seems unfair, particularly given the financial resources they are 
likely to have, the availability of insurance coverage, and the capacity of large companies operating in a national-level (if not 
international) industry to spread costs. 
  
B. Comparative Advantages of Different Forms of Tort Liability 
CO2 releases from sequestration sites could be subject to any one of the three basic forms of tort liability: negligence, 
nuisance, or trespass. Each doctrine has a particular orientation. Negligence, as the term implies, addresses negligent acts of 
defendants who owe a duty of care to a plaintiff. Nuisance centers on actions by a defendant that interfere with a plaintiff’s 
“use and enjoyment” of her land, while trespass is triggered when a defendant causes a physical intrusion on a plaintiff’s 
land. The operator of a carbon sequestration site, for example, could negligently cause CO2 to leak into an overlying aquifer 
on neighboring properties and severely degrade the water quality, thereby implicating all three tort doctrines. 
  
*37 1. Negligence: Due Care and Causation 
  
A defendant’s conduct will be deemed negligent if it causes harm to a plaintiff and does not meet the applicable duty of care 
established by statute or professional norms.199 The relevant conduct for our purposes encompasses the selection, operation, 
and closure of a sequestration site. Courts apply several subsidiary tests for reasonableness of care, including whether the 
harm was foreseeable and, if so, whether the precautions taken were a “reasonable” response to the risks at stake; defendants 
need not eliminate risk altogether.200 In complex cases involving harm to human health and the environment, causation often 
becomes a limiting element for plaintiffs because it is difficult to prove.201 A countervailing virtue of negligence is that it can 
be used by plaintiffs who are injured personally by leakage of CO2 but whose land is unaffected (for example, users of public 
water systems). 
  
The most significant risk associated with releases of brine or CO2 from sequestration sites--contamination of drinking water 
aquifers--is likely to make it difficult for plaintiffs to show that a defendant failed to exercise “reasonable care” and to 
establish causation. The standard of due care for site selection, which is the single most important decision for site 
performance,202 would have to be defined at a general level despite the heterogeneity of sites and the tradeoffs in site 
characterization methods caused by inherent technical and practical limits discussed further below.203 This analysis would 
require courts to balance the potential for site characterization to increase risks (site characterization typically requires 
drilling additional wells into a reservoir) against the benefits of additional information. Similarly, operational decisions will 
often be highly dependent on technically complex site-specific circumstances that may involve difficult tradeoffs. 
  
Establishing negligence will be further complicated if multiple defendants inject CO2 into the same brine reservoir but no 
single defendant injects more than a small fraction of the total. Absent *38 application of enhanced liability (proportional or 
strict),204 a plaintiff would have difficulty establishing causation, as no single defendant may have contributed “substantially” 
to the resulting harm.205 
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2. Relative Strengths of Trespass and Nuisance 
  
The doctrines of trespass and nuisance require showing that a defendant’s activity has encroached on a plaintiff’s property 
rights. Trespass involves an intentional, reckless, or negligent act that interferes with a plaintiff’s “possession” of her land.206 
Intent may be established if a trespass is “substantially certain” to follow from a defendant’s action, regardless of whether the 
trespass was intentional.207 For CCS, the migration of CO2 and brine is “substantially certain” to occur (estimates of 
subsurface storage capacity are in fact premised upon occurrence of significant migration) and will be the subject of 
extensive modeling at each site.208 The intentionality requirement for trespass should therefore be straightforward for 
plaintiffs to establish. 
  
Nuisance involves an interference with a plaintiff’s “use and enjoyment” of her land.209 The primary difference between 
trespass and nuisance is that trespass requires a direct physical invasion of a plaintiff’s property, whereas nuisance does not. 
For example, intrusion of CO2 into the subsurface of a plaintiff’s property could constitute a trespass,210 and if the intrusion 
interferes with the use of a plaintiff’s property (for example, by degrading water quality in a well), it could also constitute a 
nuisance.211 In general, neither doctrine requires that the defendant have a duty to use due care or that the defendant have 
acted negligently. Thus, whereas negligence involves liability-forming conduct, trespass and nuisance involve liability-
producing conditions. 
  
*39 The standards that apply under trespass and nuisance differ in several important respects. The standard for nuisance turns 
on whether a defendant has caused an unreasonable interference with a plaintiff’s foreseeable use and enjoyment of his 
property.212 Similar to negligence, courts balance the utility of a defendant’s conduct against the harms to a plaintiff in 
determining whether a nuisance exists, and this risk-benefit balancing is central to a court’s judgment.213 Other factors may 
also enter into the analysis, such as the duration of the interference; a nuisance will likely be found for persistent 
interferences even if the degree of interference is minor.214 Actions for nuisance, public or private, would cover direct 
damages to property from releases of brine or CO2.215 
  
Trespass turns on whether a defendant’s actions have caused a substance to intrude onto a plaintiff’s land.216 However, when a 
trespass occurs in the subsurface of a plaintiff’s property, trespass often becomes a special case of the nuisance doctrine, as 
many jurisdictions require that a subsurface trespass cause some kind of physical damage or interference with the use of the 
property in question.217 Commentators have also suggested that the technical challenges may make it difficult for plaintiffs to 
establish proof of subsurface trespass.218 Accordingly, absent proof of some form of interference with a foreseeable use of a 
plaintiff’s property, trespass claims will be foreclosed. 
  
As applied to releases of CO2 from sequestration sites, nuisance and trespass have two important advantages for plaintiffs 
over negligence. First, because neither trespass nor nuisance claims stemming from migration of CO2 or brine will be 
premised on negligent conduct, the fact that a defendant was meeting the conditions of a valid state or federal permit is 
largely irrelevant. The existence of a valid permit can enter a court’s nuisance analysis only *40 indirectly when it balances 
the utility of a defendant’s conduct against the harm to the plaintiff.219 By contrast, while compliance with a permit is not 
determinative in a negligence case, it is directly relevant to determining whether a defendant exercised due care.220 Second, in 
suits that arise long after the relevant conduct has occurred or decisions have been made, trespass and nuisance claims will be 
less impacted than negligence claims because they focus on current conditions rather than a defendant’s earlier conduct. 
  
Application of the two doctrines will be more complicated for releases of brine. While the benefits of bringing a nuisance 
claim for brine intrusion are identical to those for CO2, it is uncertain whether a claim of trespass will be viable. The reason 
for this is that either there will be no physical trespass of brine from a defendant’s property, or insofar as there is a trespass, it 
will be impossible to trace.221 In the latter case, the limited case law that exists suggests that trespass claims will be precluded 
unless a plaintiff can demonstrate direct and measurable damages to his property.222 
  
C. The Merits of Enhanced Tort Liability 
Three supplementary tort doctrines--strict liability, proportional liability, and joint and several liability--have the potential to 
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mitigate the challenges of establishing liability for harmful releases from sequestration sites. Strict liability eliminates the 
need to demonstrate negligence, proportional liability relaxes the standard for demonstrating causation under a theory of 
negligence, and joint and several liability makes defendants individually and collectively liable *41 for the harms at issue 
regardless of their respective contributions. These doctrines increase both the likelihood that a plaintiff will prevail and the 
potential liability of defendants, and in so doing, enhance the incentives for defendants to mitigate risks. 
  
1. The Basic Forms of Enhanced Liability Relevant to Environmental Harms 
  
For environmental harms, strict liability is triggered when a defendant owns or operates a facility from which a harmful 
substance was released regardless of whether the defendant was negligent.223 Strict liability is most commonly applied when 
products or activities are deemed to be “abnormally dangerous.”224 Courts designate activities as abnormally dangerous if they 
create a significant risk of physical harm.225 Economists justify this condition on the ground that strict liability should apply to 
activities posing risks that cannot be mitigated through due care.226 Strict liability thus complements negligence; it applies 
when a standard of due care is insufficient to mitigate the risks posed by an activity.227 Under this theory, strict liability 
provides incentives for more radical forms of risk mitigation, such as relocating or downscaling a dangerous activity.228 It 
promotes these changes by increasing the effective liability, costs of capital, and insurance coverage.229 
  
While strict liability is generally disfavored in the United States, cases involving environmental contamination are among the 
few exceptions to this general rule.230 In New Jersey, for example, several cases involving environmental contamination have 
held defendants strictly liable when they were unaware that the materials released from their facilities contained toxic 
chemicals.231 Because no cases have been filed to date that allege liability for environmental releases *42 of CO2 from 
injection operations (primarily the use of CO2 to enhance oil recovery), it is unclear whether geologic sequestration of CO2 
will trigger strict liability.232 
  
Proportional liability is a variant of negligence that is applied even more sparingly than strict liability.233 It was designed to 
address circumstances in which contributions to a source or type of harm are indivisible (for example, a toxic chemical spill 
with multiple, undifferentiated contributors).234 The doctrine lowers the effective standard for causation (a plaintiff merely has 
to demonstrate that a defendant contributed to the source of harm), and ultimate liability is based on a defendant’s relative 
contribution to an otherwise indivisible source of harm.235 Unless defendants are able to produce direct evidence of their 
relative contribution, courts use surrogate metrics, such as market share or volumetric contribution, to calculate the 
proportion of the damages for which a defendant will be liable.236 
  
Courts typically limit the application of proportional liability to circumstances in which defendants have contributed to the 
same or very similar sources of harm (for example, all sold the same product suffering from the same defect).237 This 
requirement should not preclude claims based on proportional liability for releases from sequestration sites, as potential 
defendants will all be injecting the same substance and causing identical types of harm. 
  
Joint and several liability increases the potential scope of liability for all defendants by making them collectively and 
individually responsible for all of the harms associated with an environmental release to which they have contributed.238 This 
approach enables plaintiffs to seek compensation from a single, wealthy defendant and thereby to reduce litigation costs and 
delays in receiving compensation. Equity and fairness are factored into the doctrine by allowing defendants to seek 
compensation from responsible parties who were not sued by the plaintiff.239 State-level statutory and *43 common law 
reforms have created a patchwork of approaches to joint and several liability. Although twenty or so states have retained the 
doctrine-- largely by failing to legislate restrictions--it is rarely applied in practice,240 and many states have passed laws that 
greatly limit its applicability.241 Accordingly, absent specific state or federal legislation, joint and several liability is unlikely 
to be available. 
  
2. Subjecting Sequestration Sites to Enhanced Liability: Unilateral Harms 
  
The standard justifications for strict liability do not apply to CO2 sequestration sites. Strict liability is conventionally justified 
as a gap filler when abnormally dangerous activities cannot be mitigated through the exercise of due care.242 Yet, one of our 
central arguments is that releases of either brine or CO2 from sequestration sites are unlikely to pose large risks, from which 
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one can infer that sequestration of CO2 is not an abnormally hazardous activity that warrants imposition of strict liability. The 
unique characteristics of geologic sequestration of CO2 also limit opportunities to downscale or fundamentally change 
injection processes. Indeed, to the extent that sequestration of CO2 is effective, it would occur on an extraordinarily large 
scale,243 and it is precisely this enormous capacity to mitigate CO2 emissions that makes CCS an attractive option. Economies 
of scale and the vastness of saline reservoirs further cut against reducing the size of individual sequestration sites,244 as it 
would limit the rate at which CO2 could be injected and dramatically reduce the amount that could be sequestered. 
  
These justifications overlook an often underappreciated alternative factor--the unilateral nature of the risks. In this context, a 
unilateral harm would be one solely within the control of site operators.245 The concept of unilateral harm clearly applies to 
CO2 sequestration because injured parties would be passive receptors of the harms from leakage of CO2 or brine. Subjecting 
sequestration sites to strict liability under these circumstances is economically *44 efficient because site operators--through 
siting, operational, and closure decisions--are the only parties capable of mitigating risks, and are thus by definition the 
lowest-cost risk avoiders.246 
  
This argument does not necessarily rule out negligence, which can produce economically efficient outcomes for unilateral 
risks if courts set due care at the socially optimal level.247 However, resolving the level of due care is likely to be challenging 
for courts given the limits of careful site characterization to detect certain leakage pathways,248 the diminishing returns of 
increasing the resolution of site assessments (as well as monitoring), and the risks associated with site characterization 
methods (requiring drilling additional test wells).249 In short, persistent technical uncertainties, which will vary markedly 
between sites, will cloud efforts by courts to establish a clear standard of due care. Where such uncertainty prevails, 
economic principles favor strict liability over negligence.250 
  
The relative simplicity of establishing strict liability will also lower litigation costs relative to a negligence regime. Lowering 
the cost of litigation and enhancing the likelihood of prevailing through strict liability would also increase the number of 
suits, thereby potentially increasing aggregate administrative costs.251 However, this inference ignores the potential for 
settlement rates to increase, which seems quite likely in this context. Recall that the volumes of CO2 sequestered will be 
precisely tracked,252 and this information would suffice to decisively establish causation under strict liability and to provide a 
basis for allocating liability between defendants. Collectively, these considerations suggest that the net impact on 
administrative costs will likely favor strict liability over negligence or will at worst be a wash. 
  
Liability, even for modest risks, still has the potential to impact site-selection decisions.253 Rough estimates of sequestration 
capacities *45 in the United States suggest that, at least in the near-term, many high-quality sites will be available.254 This 
surplus should continue during the early period of CCS deployment when experience is being gained rapidly. The availability 
of multiple potential sites suggests that liability, particularly strict liability, can be used to encourage facility owners to locate 
sequestration sites in low-risk regions. If geologic sequestration of CO2 is successful, cost-premiums will increase for higher-
quality sites, but by that time scientists may have a better understanding of harmful releases and perhaps improved methods 
for mitigating them, and this information could be integrated into formal siting and site-operation regulations. Tort liability is 
therefore likely to be most effective during the earlier stages of CCS deployment. 
  
The applicability of proportional liability, which requires a showing of negligence, will be limited to circumstances under 
which either (1) subsurface CO2 plumes overlap and are a source of leakage, or (2) zones of elevated pressure around 
injections wells interact such that reservoir pressures at a point of leakage (such as an abandoned well) are driven by them 
collectively. As we have seen, the latter case is both much more probable, given the huge projected areas of elevated 
pressure, and is likely to arise much earlier.255 Although plaintiffs rarely succeed in convincing courts to invoke proportional 
liability, the detailed information that will be available on injection volumes of CO2 and the identical nature of the 
contributions from injection sites--each injecting only CO2 and all driving pressure increases-- make this an ideal case for 
proportional liability. Insofar as negligence is viewed as the appropriate legal regime, proportional liability will be 
indispensable. 
  
The case for imposing joint and several liability is by far the weakest. Unlike many of the contaminated sites covered by 
Superfund, the number of potential defendants should be tractable given the scale of the operations, the potential for 
defendants to be judgment-proof (whether through bankruptcy or low capitalization) will be low, and the magnitude of the 
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likely impacts will be modest. Under these circumstances, the potential for over-deterrence, which naturally arises when the 
scope of liability is expanded beyond what a given defendant is responsible for, is likely to outweigh the benefits to  *46 
plaintiffs. Neither the number of potential defendants nor the challenges of identifying them is likely to limit plaintiffs’ 
ability to file a suit. 
  
An important caveat must be kept in mind: like all other forms of ex post liability, the incentives created by enhanced forms 
of liability will depend on the timing of CO2 or brine leakage. For reasons discussed above,256 if releases largely occur after a 
significant latency period (decades after active injection of CO2 ceases), enhanced liability will have only very modest 
deterrence value. Insofar as enhanced liability targets relatively near-term risks, it can be a useful complement to traditional 
regulatory requirements. The degree to which this holds may be mitigated by the uncertainties about the timing of site 
leakage, but rigorous regulatory standards will be necessary regardless of the liability regime put in place. 
  
D. The Appropriate Role of Tort Liability 
Commentators have focused significant attention on how enhanced liability could be applied to sequestration sites. Alexandra 
Klass and Elizabeth Wilson have suggested that application of strict liability will vary from state to state.257 They predict that 
strict liability would not be applied in states like Texas, where CO2 is used routinely in enhanced oil recovery, but could be 
applied in Eastern or Midwestern states where it remains a novelty.258 John Moore has expressed concern about scenarios in 
which leakage of CO2 poses much greater risks than currently predicted.259 He raises the specter of a mass-tort scenario in 
which “owners and operators of . . . facilities could potentially be liable to a large number of claimants . . . within tens or 
hundreds of kilometers of injection sites.”260 His concern rests on the potential breadth of harm and the low barrier to suit 
created by strict liability.261 
  
Surprisingly, debate over the applicability of enhanced liability has tended to avoid normative theories such as those 
discussed above. Moore’s concern that large numbers of plaintiffs could potentially file *47 suit comes closest, but the 
scenario itself is highly speculative, and he does not ground his argument on economic principles. The CCS industry’s 
hostility to enhanced liability is also based on speculative scenarios of debilitating liability.262 In the opposing camp, Klass 
and Wilson have asserted that neither strict liability nor joint and several liability should be rejected out of hand, and 
articulated mild support for a specialized law establishing enhanced liability for releases of CO2 from sequestration sites.263 
Citing some of the principles discussed above, they base these claims on the belief that enhanced liability would enable 
plaintiffs injured by a CO2 leak to obtain funding for remediation actions and compensation for damages.264 
  
These theoretical gaps have been compounded by the abstract treatment of the risks at stake. The timing of potential harms is, 
as we have seen, central to the effectiveness of tort liability, and timing turns on the nature of a release and the technical 
capacities to detect it. Subsurface monitoring can identify leakage from a sequestration reservoir long before impacts on risk 
receptors arise, and thus before legally cognizable harms exist.265 Surface or near-subsurface monitoring can detect direct 
impacts on drinking water quality, but scientists believe that such releases would not be detectable “at a well-designed 
storage site in the foreseeable future” (with only very small and slow leakage points).266 Moreover, extended periods of 
latency (beyond the operational phase of a site) could foreclose most avenues for altering site operation--apart from the 
drastic option of removing stored CO2--and limit options to near-surface remediation or natural attenuation. In any event, 
latency would also greatly diminish the deterrence value of tort liability. 
  
The best cases from a liability standpoint will involve relatively near-term releases (during site operation or closure) with 
readily detectable impacts. The only realistic candidates will involve releases of brine or CO2 through significant transmissive 
faults or abandoned *48 wells.267 These types of releases have been singled out by numerous scientists as the most important 
source of risk from sequestration sites, but in the case of faults, they can also be the most difficult to identify during site 
characterization.268 Both the early timing and elusiveness of these risks play to the strengths of ex post liability,269 and thus 
make them ideal test cases for comparing the relative virtues of different forms of liability. 
  
1. The Net Effect of Imposing Enhanced Liability 
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The case for enhanced liability is strong but requires a nuanced understanding of the circumstances under which harmful 
leakage from a sequestration site is likely to occur. The current debate largely sidesteps the factual details and economic 
grounds on which liability regimes are conventionally evaluated. As discussed above, we believe that the single most 
important factor favoring enhanced liability is the unilateral nature of the harms; site operators are the least-cost avoiders 
because only they have the capacity to prevent or mitigate harm. However, the practical value of enhanced liability cannot be 
assessed without considering the overlapping standards of conventional tort doctrines of nuisance and trespass. Recall that 
while neither nuisance nor trespass claims will require a showing of negligence, trespass is essentially a strict liability 
doctrine, whereas nuisance requires the court to balance the utilities of the opposing parties. In either case, the net effect of 
imposing strict liability cannot be evaluated without considering the applicability of these other tort doctrines. 
  
Relative to negligence, strict liability increases the likelihood that plaintiffs will prevail and thus file suit. To varying degrees, 
the same can be said of trespass and nuisance. The applicability of these doctrines will turn on plaintiffs showing that a 
defendant has interfered with a property right--a requirement which large releases of CO2 or brine into a drinking water 
aquifer could meet. Depending on the magnitude of the impacts, the balancing of the utilities *49 required under nuisance 
could also favor plaintiffs, given that reasonable measures should be available to avoid or mitigate harms (for example, 
reduce injection rates, plug a leaking well, or treat affected water sources).270 Under these circumstances, the application of 
strict liability and trespass will track each other, while the balancing required under nuisance adds a layer of analytical 
uncertainty. 
  
These doctrinal similarities suggest that for near-term releases involving a single defendant, strict liability would not increase 
the plaintiffs’ odds of success over trespass claims and may not be markedly superior to nuisance. One must nevertheless be 
careful to consider the distinct conditions under which releases of CO2 and brine can occur. For a single injector, the source 
of a CO2 release will be easily traceable and will necessarily involve a trespass, implying that all three doctrines will apply. 
Releases of brine, however, will be triggered by elevated pressures, which could extend miles from the injection well.271 At 
these distances, no plausible basis will exist for claiming that brine from a defendant’s property has trespassed onto a 
plaintiff’s property because actual physical movement of brine is projected to occur on the order of feet, not miles.272 This 
result implies that plaintiffs will rarely be able to bring a claim for trespass. 
  
The rough parity in deterrence provided by strict liability and standard forms of liability will be broken further when multiple 
parties sequester CO2 in the same deep saline reservoir. Recent scientific modeling has found that zones of elevated pressure 
around injection wells are likely to interact within years to decades, at which point it will be impossible to separate the 
contributions from each well to pressure buildup in a reservoir.273 Moreover, although the specific timing will depend on the 
distances between injection wells, model results suggest that wells spaced tens of kilometers apart will interact within a few 
years.274 By contrast, the model results were just *50 the opposite for CO2 plumes, which were projected to remain relatively 
localized and thus unlikely to overlap.275 
  
To date, it has been the potential indivisibility of CO2 plumes from different injection wells that has often animated calls for 
applying enhanced forms of liability to sequestration sites. Strict liability would circumvent the problem by defining 
causation broadly (as contributing to CO2 injections into a reservoir). Proportional liability would redefine causation in a 
similar manner, but it would also require plaintiffs to demonstrate that each defendant acted negligently. Under this approach, 
joint and several liability would reduce litigation costs and delays by enabling plaintiffs to sue a single party for the total 
damages.276 Both strict liability and strict, joint and several liability would increase the likelihood of plaintiffs successfully 
bringing suit relative to proportional liability. 
  
The net benefits of the different doctrines will clearly differ depending on whether a release involves CO2 or brine. Harmful 
releases of CO2 will be subject to strict liability under the doctrine of trespass irrespective of whether enhanced forms of 
liability are available because CO2 plumes from different injection wells are unlikely to overlap. Subjecting these types of 
releases to enhanced liability is therefore unlikely to have any effect. On the other hand, pressure-driven releases of brine will 
rarely entail a trespass, and where multiple parties are involved, the pressure effects driving a release will not be attributable 
to a single injector. This result suggests that accountability for such releases will typically be foreclosed absent enhanced 
liability. Put differently, the motivation for applying strict liability to sequestration sites ought to rest solely on the potential 
risks associated with releases of brine. 
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2. Negligence Versus Strict Liability 
  
A critical factor in deciding between negligence and strict liability is the likelihood that courts will establish an efficient level 
of due care. In general, to the extent that determining the level of due care is technically complex and site-specific, strict 
liability will be favored over negligence or proportional liability.277 Strict liability in essence transfers judgments about due 
care from the courts to  *51 defendants, who are presumed to possess the information and requisite knowledge to evaluate 
risks and benefits. We have already argued that the limits of geological data and the heterogeneity of site characteristics favor 
imposition of strict liability.278 But these factors are most relevant to ex ante site selection, which differs in substance and 
information content from operational decisions. 
  
This distinction is important because the incentives provided by liability are quite different at the site selection and 
operational phases of a sequestration project. The differences can be appreciated by considering them separately. Focusing 
first on site selection, there would be no added value in imposing strict liability on the best class of sites, as such sites would 
already be in optimal locations. By contrast, applying strict liability to low-quality sites could deter companies from selecting 
them based on attributes other than safety. Accordingly, to the extent that sites can be ranked (even roughly) upfront, 
efficiency could be enhanced by tiering the form of liability based upon the ranking of a sequestration site: negligence for the 
best sites, and strict liability for lower-quality sites. 
  
In practice, site selection will not be determinative of risk, although it is generally viewed as a site operator’s single most 
important choice regarding safety. Operational decisions (such as monitoring systems and protocols) are important because 
they can facilitate identification of releases and mitigate their impacts. This will be true of even the best sites because certain 
key variables (for example, reservoir permeability) cannot be resolved at the site selection stage.279 Further, at the operational 
stage the exercise of due care is less affected by the information gaps that exist when a site is selected, as a substantial 
amount of additional information is generated once a site is running.280 
  
This qualitative analysis suggests that negligence can provide an efficient level of deterrence against operational risks, 
assuming of course that courts can set the level of due care efficiently. If true, this would also support a tiered system of 
liability. For the best sites, liability would be directed solely at operational risks, for which negligence may suffice. For 
lower-quality sites, strict liability would *52 promote proper site selection, but this decision also implicates operational 
decisions because the nature and magnitude of a site’s risks will be a function of both site selection and operational decisions, 
as will the quality of the information available (better sites will typically be easier to monitor). Accordingly, because 
operational decisions are more complicated for poorer sites, it makes sense to subject them to strict liability as well. 
  
It is worth noting that the relative value of liability may increase for operational decisions. Information asymmetries between 
site operators and regulators are likely to increase because significant new information is generated during the CO2 injection 
process.281 Yet, resource constraints will limit the EPA’s capacity to scrutinize this new data and knowledge,282 much of which 
will be relevant to assessing risks.283 The information generated will also be highly site-specific, thereby limiting the benefits 
of scale that can enhance the relative efficiency of regulatory programs.284 For the types of near-term risks implicated here, 
the likely emergence of information asymmetries reinforces the potential for tort liability to complement traditional 
regulatory regimes based on uniform minimum standards. 
  
Synthesizing our findings leads to the following conclusions. First, absent legislative intervention, releases of CO2 will be 
subject to strict liability through trespass. Second, some form of enhanced liability (strict or proportional) should apply to 
releases of brine to overcome the indivisibility problems that could otherwise preclude plaintiffs from successfully bringing 
claims under either negligence or nuisance. Third, the deterrence value of liability--whatever its form--will be limited to the 
relatively near-term risks associated with releases through faults or abandoned wells. These findings reveal that the current 
debate over regulation of sequestration sites ignores the primary source of risk--brine intrusion--and misapprehends the legal 
*53 issues in both the short and the long term. In particular, the debate has overstated the potential role of tort liability as a 
policy instrument for promoting safe sequestration of CO2 and the importance of liability in mitigating long-term risks. 
  
The preceding discussion provides a theoretically grounded model for enabling liability to complement regulations more 
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effectively. We have shown that a strong case exists for extending strict liability to all sites for releases of CO2 and brine: the 
harms are unilateral, and it will be challenging for courts to set an efficient level of due care. However, the political 
opposition to subjecting sequestration sites to strict liability is likely to preclude this approach, as is the judicial trend against 
imposing strict liability. Conventional principles of economic efficiency also support selective extension of strict liability if 
courts can set efficient levels of care for operational decisions, which the higher-quality information available for low-risk 
sites ought to facilitate. Under this two-tiered framework, strict liability would apply to lower-quality sites (such as sites with 
poor cap rock or valuable overlying aquifers), while negligence or proportional liability or both would apply to high-quality 
sites for releases of brine (trespass will cover harm from releases of CO2 from all sites). 
  
This system would supplement a traditional ex ante regulatory regime, which is itself vulnerable to substantial informational 
gaps and asymmetries, by providing an added (albeit limited) incentive for site owners to select higher-quality sequestration 
sites. This pragmatic approach attempts to balance the twin virtues of efficiency and political viability without sacrificing the 
primary benefits of the former in favor of the latter. Nevertheless, because this approach would require new legislation 
(perhaps an amendment to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)285), we should also assess alternative purely regulatory 
approaches. As described further below, we expect political opposition to rigorous oversight to be substantial, whatever form 
it takes. We propose this hybrid approach both because it is normatively grounded on conservative economic principles and 
because we believe it has political virtues that could mitigate industry opposition. 
  
*54 IV. A Two-Tiered System of Liability and Minimum Performance-Based Standards 
In this final section, we further describe our hybrid policy framework for geologic sequestration of CO2 that exploits the 
complementary strengths of common law liability and traditional regulation. The framework uses enhanced liability in 
conjunction with regulatory standards and data: sites below a specified safety ranking would be subject to strict liability and 
possibly heightened regulatory requirements (such as additional site characterization requirements). This selective use of 
strict liability is designed to provide an added incentive for site owners to select low-risk sequestration sites, particularly 
during the early phases of CCS deployment. As it stands, the EPA’s Underground Injection Control (UIC) program is legally 
limited to setting minimum standards, which will not provide an incentive, particularly in the near term, for site operators to 
select the highest-quality sites.286 
  
Consistent with the preceding discussion, we believe that uncertainties about the technical, economic, and political viability 
of CCS are far more significant than the speculative concerns about long-term liability and alleged large-scale risks 
associated with CO2 sequestration. However, the only way to begin the process of resolving these uncertainties about CCS 
viability is to construct full-scale CCS facilities, including sequestration sites. These efforts are being impeded, in part, by 
concerns about legal liability and risks to the environment and human health. Programs designed to promote deployment of 
CCS are unlikely to be successful without effective regulatory and liability policies, and ideally should be coordinated with 
them. The integration of regulatory and deployment policies is discussed in the final subsection below. 
  
A. The Current Legal Environment: Federal Versus State Regulation 
None of the existing federal laws, on its own, provides a comprehensive regulatory framework for carbon sequestration. The 
EPA currently regulates sequestration of CO2 through its UIC program under the SDWA.287 The UIC program was designed 
to regulate traditional threats to ground and surface water from toxic *55 contaminants,288 but the EPA’s authority to regulate 
underground injection under the SDWA is limited to setting minimum standards.289 Thus, while the SDWA addresses the 
primary sources of risk (impacts on groundwater from CO2 or brine), to the extent that high-quality sites are more costly to 
purchase or operate (for example, because of deeper reservoirs), the law does not provide any incentives for companies to go 
beyond the EPA’s minimum standards. 
  
The limitations of other statutes are even greater. If CO2 were categorized as a “hazardous waste,” its disposal could be 
controlled under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),290 which imposes enhanced liability for 
environmental releases and a panoply of stringent regulations covering the “handling, storage, and disposal” of hazardous 
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wastes.291 However, RCRA is directed almost exclusively at surface disposal of wastes.292 Similarly, sequestration sites will be 
regulated under the Clean Air Act, but such regulations would apply only to releases of CO2 directly into the atmosphere.293 
Finally, Superfund could be amended to cover releases of CO2 or brine into the environment,294 but it imposes an elaborate 
procedural architecture that is unlikely to be needed for sequestration sites295 and, of equal importance, would incite strong 
industry opposition given private sector aversion to Superfund. 
  
Several states have passed, or are working to pass, sequestration-specific legislation, including limits on tort liability, rules 
for determining pore-space ownership, and laws covering the siting and operation of carbon sequestration sites.296 These 
trends raise the *56 prospect that the regulatory standards and potential tort liability applicable to geologic sequestration of 
CO2 will become an interstate patchwork that could undermine effective deployment of CCS. Industry representatives and 
commentators have already raised concerns that differences in legal regimes--rather than technical merits--may become a 
significant determinant of where companies choose to locate CO2 sequestration sites.297 One could also question whether state 
agencies and courts, particularly in states lacking experience with these types of activities (for example, with CO2-based 
enhanced oil recovery), will have the resources or expertise needed to oversee the operation of sequestration sites. 
  
Reasonable arguments can be made both for and against uniform federal legislation that would preempt state laws.298 
Regulation of impacts on drinking water under the SDWA, existing federal regulation of waste disposal and environmental 
releases of hazardous substances, and federal efforts to regulate CO2 emissions each provide solid precedent for federal-level 
legislation. Yet states retain regulatory authority over oil and gas development, which shares many regulatory issues with 
geologic sequestration of CO2 and is directly implicated when CO2 is used to enhance oil recovery. Further, carbon 
sequestration is likely to occur in only a small number of states (including Illinois, Ohio, and Texas) over the next few 
decades,299 which ought to diminish immediate concerns about the emergence of inconsistent and competing state-level legal 
regimes. 
  
On balance we believe that the current regime of minimum performance-based standards under the SDWA, which place a 
floor on potential “races to the bottom” between states in setting *57 regulatory standards for sequestration sites, ought to be 
retained. The anti-regulatory bias of several of the states promoting CCS (Mississippi, Texas, and Wyoming, among others)300 
suggests that such downward pressures are not merely speculative. These considerations are reinforced by the regional scale 
at which oversight of deep saline reservoirs should occur and by the fact that many reservoirs cross state lines,301 both of 
which raise the potential for interstate conflict. The critical importance of site selection to mitigating potential risks 
underscores the need for establishing a consistent set of minimum standards across the country to ensure that sites are 
selected for their merits rather than the regulatory environment. 
  
Additionally, we see little downside to regulatory uniformity in the form of minimum performance standards given the 
limited range of risks involved. Notwithstanding the variability of site conditions, the basic attributes of the risks (threats to 
groundwater quality) are unlikely to vary markedly between well-selected sites.302 Similarly, the economies of scale that can 
be gained by centralizing regulation in the federal government, the perceived novelty of sequestering CO2 deep underground, 
and the global nature of climate change all favor a federal regulatory scheme.303 While we do not view the case for preemptive 
minimum federal standards as beyond dispute, numerous factors weigh in favor of it and few, if any, strongly against. 
  
Minimum federal standards will not, however, ensure that the best sites are selected; instead, they will only exclude higher-
risk sites from being developed. Yet, the surplus of available sites, persistent technical uncertainties, and political volatility 
surrounding geologic sequestration of CO2 all suggest that incentives for developing the lowest-risk sites during the early 
phases of CCS deployment ought to be a priority. The surplus of potential sites implies that there will be ample opportunity 
for early entrants to select low-risk sites. Similarly, although the absolute risks are projected to be low, the technical 
uncertainties leave open the potential for unanticipated releases to occur in an unforgiving political environment that is 
hypersensitive to any incidents involving environmental releases, regardless of their  *58 impacts. Minimum federal 
standards, unless uncharacteristically risk averse, will not foreclose environmental releases that could trigger a major public 
backlash against CCS. 
  
Tiered tort liability has the capacity to augment federal standards, particularly during the early stages of CCS deployment, by 
providing an added incentive for operators to select high-quality sites. While a tiered framework could be implemented 
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through a regulatory regime, this approach would entail broader federal preemption of state regulations and, as discussed 
further in the next subsection, would be subject to the limitations--particularly information asymmetries--of a pure regulatory 
approach. It would also require legislative action extending the existing regulatory system under the SDWA, which, in the 
current political environment in Washington, D.C., is likely to provoke strong opposition in Congress.304 
  
Our hybrid regime is less intrusive, although it would also require new legislation to establish a program for ranking 
sequestration sites, as well as rules governing liability for environmental releases from them. This hybrid approach has three 
primary virtues over a pure regulatory regime: First, the ranking system is a form of information-based regulation that is 
backed up by the incentives provided by common law liability, and as such avoids the trappings of “command and control” 
regulation that is likely to inspire the strongest opposition from regulatory critics. Second, our approach minimizes federal 
preemption of state programs; federal rules would merely dictate which sites could be subject to strict liability.305 Third, the 
imposition of enhanced liability on lower-ranked sequestration sites is supported by principles of economic efficiency and 
mitigated by the modest magnitude of the risks and liabilities at stake. 
  
*59 The status of CCS as a new technology subject to a variety of informational constraints is another critical factor that 
places significant limits on ex ante regulation. In particular, the near-term releases projected by scientists to be the most 
significant--those from faults or abandoned wells--will be extremely difficult for a general regulatory regime to mitigate.306 
Accordingly, ex post liability is both better suited to addressing them and has the political virtues identified above. 
  
These informational deficits, as we expect, are likely to diminish as deployment of CCS progresses. The experience and 
knowledge gained may allow the EPA’s formal regulatory program to become more discriminating and to gain the capacity 
to mitigate these types of near-term risks, which in turn could allow the EPA to develop a more refined approach to 
regulating sequestration sites. If this occurs, a pure regulatory approach may be preferable, particularly as it may allow for a 
more fine-grained, multi-level categorization of sites. In the interim, the rough two-level system of tort liability that we are 
proposing would partially fill this temporary gap by exploiting the complementary strengths of an independent government-
based system for ranking sites and the incentives provided by a decentralized liability-based system. 
  
This hybrid framework would not be a cure-all, but that is neither achievable nor our objective. Throughout this article we 
wanted to examine the limits of tort liability in promoting safe deployment of CCS and how, given these constraints, tort 
liability could best be utilized towards this end. We have found that, for a variety of reasons, tort liability will be limited to 
playing only a supplementary role to traditional performance-based regulations. In this light, we have outlined how liability 
could be effectively leveraged in this secondary role; namely, to provide additional incentives for selection of low-risk 
sequestration sites. 
  
B. Creating Complementary Regulatory and Liability Regimes 
Similar to other commentators, we believe that regulation of sequestration sites should be structured around the different 
stages of site operations (active operation and injection of CO2, site closure, a 10 to 30 year period of post-closure monitoring 
and oversight, and finally long-term stewardship).307 We also agree that when a site *60 transitions to long-term stewardship, 
it should be transferred to a government entity that will have sole responsibility for the sequestration site, including all 
liabilities. 
  
However, our approach differs from other proposals in two primary respects: First, it emphasizes measures to promote 
selection of the safest sequestration sites and, in doing so, places less reliance on site monitoring and close oversight by 
federal regulators. Second, our framework integrates a formal regulatory regime and common law liability through a 
comprehensive system of mapping and ranking potential sequestration sites. This ranking would be conducted by a federal 
agency (most likely the U.S. Geological Survey) and used to determine whether a site will be subject to strict liability. The 
Department of Energy has already compiled a national database of prospective reservoirs for sequestration of CO2, which 
would support such a national assessment.308 
  
We believe that a rough ranking of sequestration sites would be neither technically demanding nor cost-prohibitive.309 Well-
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established methods are available to analyze key factors, such as the depth of a proposed reservoir, density and depth of 
existing wells in the area, quality of the primary rock seal above a reservoir, vertical distance to the deepest freshwater 
aquifer, presence of potentially transmissive faults, and location of other risk receptors (for example, valuable overlying 
natural gas reservoirs).310 We believe that the limited risk assessments needed to support such a ranking would, on a per-site 
basis, amount to a small fraction of the cost of a full site characterization.311 Equally important, the ranking would be based on 
data that are quite accurate and straightforward to interpret.312 
  
*61 This informational approach draws on a hierarchical permitting system recently proposed by Jean-Philippe Nicot and Ian 
Duncan.313 Under their scheme, a government agency would map, characterize, and rank deep brine reservoirs that are 
candidates for geologic sequestration of CO2.314 Rather than linking this assessment to liability, Nicot and Duncan adopt a 
pure regulatory approach that tiers permitting requirements (such as the extent of testing and information requirements) to the 
rank of each site, and they further suggest that regional-level permits could be developed under which site-specific permits be 
fast-tracked.315 Consistent with our approach, their framework emphasizes passive geological safety characteristics (for 
example, reservoir depth and impermeable cap rock layers) and is intended to complement the EPA’s minimum performance-
based standards.316 
  
The hybrid regulatory-liability framework that we propose could be used in conjunction with the Nicot-Duncan scheme, but 
the relative strengths of the two approaches will depend on specific attributes of the risks involved. As we have seen, two 
factors are critical to assessing the relative virtues of regulation versus liability: the latency of environmental harms and the 
information asymmetries between the private sector and the government.317 The greater the latency of leakage from carbon 
sequestration sites, the stronger the case for a pure regulatory regime and the less effective traditional common law liability. 
In opposition to this factor, the greater the information asymmetries between the private sector and the government, the more 
a liability regime is favored. 
  
While significant uncertainties remain, scientific modeling has shown that the latency for leakage of CO2 is likely to last for 
many decades after injection, whereas releases of brine could arise within a decade.318 If these projections prove accurate, the 
effectiveness of common law liability is likely to turn on the near-term risks *62 associated with brine releases. In general, 
lower-ranked sites, such as those in areas with many abandoned wells or with less reliable cap rock, will be more likely to 
leak early than highly ranked sites. Therefore, these characteristics would enhance the relative deterrence value of a liability 
regime for lower-quality sites. 
  
Information asymmetries will nevertheless persist with a federal site-ranking program, as it would be limited to basic site 
characterization data. More detailed and new site information will become available only during the active CO2 injection 
phase of a sequestration site.319 Moreover, while government regulations will require site operators to disclose at least some of 
this information, the EPA’s capacity to monitor operations and emerging reservoir data will be limited by resources and 
time.320 As a consequence, information asymmetries could very well increase as operations at sequestration sites evolve and 
site operators gain direct experience. 
  
The countervailing effects of latency and information asymmetries suggest three possible legal frameworks for the period 
spanning site selection, operation, and active post-closure. To the extent that latency is dominant, and thus liability largely 
ineffective, the Nicot-Duncan supplementary regulatory regime would be favored. Under this scheme, sites with lower scores 
could be subject to more stringent regulatory review and higher permitting fees (better sites could also be fast-tracked), CO2 
mitigation credits could be discounted (if a U.S. market were established), or there could be some combination of both 
mechanisms.321 On the other end of the spectrum, if information asymmetries were dominant and latency minimal, a pure 
liability regime that incorporates a system of strict liability for all sites would be favored, as private knowledge would 
dominate. 
  
We have shown that the risks of releases from sequestration sites will involve a mix of near-term risks from faults or 
abandoned wells, which initial site characterization is unlikely to identify, and risks subject to substantial periods of 
latency.322 This mix of short- and longer-term risks combined with significant information gaps and asymmetries supports a 
hybrid regulatory-liability regime. While the *63 information gaps present when sites are permitted would undermine the 
efficiency of a tiered regulatory-only regime, they would not impede the effectiveness of an ex post liability regime. 
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Similarly, while the latency of risks would erode the incentives provided by common law liability, minimum performance-
based standards would place a lower limit on the effective magnitude of all risks, latent or otherwise, posed by sequestration 
sites. The regulatory and liability regimes thus complement each other by leveraging private knowledge to address risks that 
are inchoate when a site is permitted and by exploiting the robust public knowledge that is available upfront to establish 
minimum safety standards. 
  
This hybrid framework is consistent with principles of economic efficiency and a precautionary approach to environmental 
protection. By using strict liability to promote selection of higher quality sequestration sites but making selection contingent 
on well-established criteria for site quality, the hybrid approach has the potential to mitigate industry opposition without 
sacrificing safety or efficiency. This approach is viable in significant part because a surplus of high-quality sites will exist for 
the next several decades, and it will be most effective during the early stages of CCS deployment when knowledge and 
experience are still being gained about the risks and reliability of sequestration sites. As the quality of information increases 
and the surplus of sites falls, we expect that the balance between regulation and liability will shift. Over time, more refined 
regulations will be possible, and the role of liability in providing meaningful incentives to select superior sites will diminish. 
  
C. Early-Stage Carbon Sequestration Projects 
The urgency surrounding mitigation of CO2 emissions places a premium on facilitating rapid development of CCS. Yet, the 
large technical hurdles, uncertainties about the integrity of sequestration sites, and the extremely large upfront capital 
demands of CCS projects collectively present major barriers to its deployment. Broad consensus exists that large-scale pilot 
projects will be essential to overcoming these barriers, particularly as many of them cannot be assessed reliably without full-
scale plants and sequestration sites.323 *64 Successful government involvement will almost certainly require some form of 
shared public-private projects, such as those incorporated into the failed Waxman-Markey climate change legislation that was 
passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in July 2009 but was never taken up by the Senate.324 
  
Industry concerns about liability have prompted a number of commentators to suggest that limiting liability (for example, 
capping damages under strict liability, similar to the Oil Pollution Act325) for leakage from early-stage carbon sequestration 
sites could promote early entrants into the CCS industry.326 We believe that this is unnecessary because the projected 
magnitude of the potential damages is modest, implying that a cap would be unnecessary. Put differently, it would be 
extremely unlikely that the damages associated with releases from a sequestration site would ever exceed the strict liability 
cap. However, industry may still desire such a cap given the novelty of geologic sequestration. If the cap is set sufficiently 
high (that is, above reasonably projected impacts), it need not be inconsistent with our hybrid approach. We expect politically 
viable caps would not be a problem given the modest levels of the projected impacts, and we thus believe that there need not 
be a conflict between our tiered approach and those of other commentators. That said, in practice we anticipate that such 
liability caps will have little more than symbolic value. 
  
The need for additional incentives to encourage early entrants is significant, but the primary barriers to CCS deployment are 
the large upfront economic costs and remaining technological uncertainties, particularly with respect to capturing CO2. 
Addressing them will require creative use of public-private partnerships, tax incentives, and direct subsidies, each of which 
has been incorporated into prior climate change bills in Congress, most notably the Waxman-Markey bill.327 While each of 
these alternatives has significant fiscal implications at a time of economic austerity in the United States, the use of liability 
caps cannot surmount these barriers because they are not designed to mitigate or overcome them. Tort liability is directed at 
negative externalities, whereas the primary barriers to deployment *65 of CCS involve unrelated technological uncertainties 
that will not be affected by a liability cap. 
  
One final point is worth highlighting: the complementary roles that regulation and tort liability can play are of particular 
importance to geologic carbon sequestration. The novelty of carbon sequestration is already raising public fears.328 
Overcoming these fears will require concerted efforts by the industry, government, and non-governmental organizations to 
promote operational transparency and public understanding of carbon sequestration. 
  
Transparency can be compelled through regulations or liability suits.329 However, tort liability also creates disincentives for 
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companies to collect information that could be used against them in a lawsuit.330 Ensuring that regulations and tort liability are 
harmonized to promote transparency will be especially important because the industry will possess detailed site information 
that, unless obtained through regulatory channels, will not be available to state and federal agencies.331 Reporting 
requirements that apply to all CO2 emissions ought to ensure that most of the relevant information is public, but insofar as 
they do not, it will be imperative that sequestration-site-specific reporting requirements are in place and rigorously enforced 
to ensure that regulations keep up with evolving sequestration technologies and knowledge.332 
  
Conclusion 
This article challenges several misconceptions about the risks associated with geologic sequestration of CO2 and the 
significance of open-ended legal liability. We have shown that the current debate is overly focused on the risks associated 
with CO2 leakage and *66 insufficiently attentive to the primary source of risk--releases of brine into drinking water aquifers. 
This oversight has important legal implications because the nature and timing of the two types of risks are quite different. As 
a general rule, releases of brine are much more likely and are projected to occur much earlier in the lifecycle of a 
sequestration site than releases of CO2. 
  
Understanding the nature of these risks, particularly their modest impacts and relative simplicity, ought to diffuse the 
controversy over legal liability for CCS. As we have demonstrated, loss of incentives provided by long-term liability is 
ultimately of negligible importance. Nevertheless, near-term liability can play a meaningful role, albeit a limited one, if it is 
directed primarily at risks associated with releases of brine. 
  
Our analysis also reveals that principles of economic efficiency support imposing either strict liability or negligence, 
although a stronger case exists for strict liability. We advocate a two-tiered system of liability that is based on two distinct 
classes of decisions--site selection and operational judgments--that operates in parallel with minimum federal performance 
standards. This tiered hybrid approach leverages public and private information to enhance efficiency. However, we 
ultimately advocate this approach to mitigate problems with low political viability that would be associated with an effort to 
impose strict liability on owners or operators of sequestration sites. 
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